==Phrack Magazine== Volume Four, Issue Forty-Three, File 14 of 27#!/bin/sh# Playing Hide and Seek, Unix style.# By Phreak Accident## A "how-to" in successfully hiding and removing your electronic footprints# while gaining unauthorized access to someone else's computer system (Unix in# this case).# Start counting ..Hmm. Sucks don't it? Breaking into a system but only to have your accesscut off the next day. Right before you had the chance to download that 2megabyte source code file you have been dying to get all year.Why was the access cut? Damn, you forgot to nuke that .rhosts file thatyou left in the root directory. Or maybe it was the wtmp entries you didn'tbother to edit. Or perhaps the tcp_wrapper logs that you didn't bother tolook for. Whatever it was, it just screwed your access and perhaps, justgot you busted.---- Simulated incident report follows:From: mark@abene.com (Mark Dorkenski)Message-Id: To: incident-report@cert.orgSubject: Cracker BreakinStatus: ROTo whom it may concern, Last night 2 of our machines were penetrated by an unauthorizeduser. Apparently the cracker (or crackers) involved didn't botherto clean up after they left. The following are logs generated from the time the break-inoccurred.[/usr/adm/wtmp]:oracle ttyp1 192.148.8.15 Tue May 11 02:12 - 04:00 (02:12)sync ttyp2 192.148.8.15 Tue May 11 01:47 - 01:47 (00:00)robert console Mon May 10 06:00 - 04:15 (22:14)reboot Mon May 10 05:59shutdown Sun May 9 11:04[/usr/adm/messages]:May 11 02:02:54 abene.com login: 3 LOGIN FAILURES FROM 192.148.8.15May 11 02:00:32 abene.com login: 4 LOGIN FAILURES FROM 192.148.8.15[/usr/adm/pacct]:ls - oracle ttyp1 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:37cat - oracle ttyp1 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:37ls - oracle ttyp1 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:37ls - oracle ttyp1 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:37rdist - root ttyp1 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:37sh - root ttyp0 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:37ed - root ttyp0 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:37rlogin - root ttyp0 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:37ls - root ttyp0 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:37more - root ttyp0 0.00 secs Tue May 2 19:34We have found and plugged the areas of vulnerability and have restoredoriginal binaries back to the system. We have already informed the properauthorities of the breakin, including the domain contact at the remotehost in question.Can you please relay any information regarding incident reports in ourarea? Mark Dorkenski Network Operations---- End of incident report Hey, it's human nature to be careless and lazy. But, when you're a hacker,and you're illegally breaking into computer systems this isn't a luxury thatyou can afford. Your efforts in penetrating have to be exact, concise,sharp, witty and skillful. You have to know when to retreat, run, hide,pounce or spy. Let us put it this way, when you get your feet muddy andwalk on new carpet without cleaning it up, you're gonna get spanked. I can't tell you how many times I've see a hacker break into a system andleave their muddy footprints all over the system. Hell, a quarter of thehosts on the Internet need to be steam-cleaned. This is sad. Especially since you could have had the ability to do thewashing yourself. Why bother cracking systems if you leave unauthorized loginmessages on the console for the administrators? Beats me. This article is about hiding your access--the little tricks of the tradethat keep you unnoticed and hidden from that evil bastard, the systemadministrator. I should probably start by explaining exactly where common accounting/logfiles are kept and their roles in keeping/tracking system information.# Drinking jolt and jerking the logs Syslog(3), The "Big Daddy" of logging daemons, is the master of all systemaccounting and log reporting. Most system components and applicationsdepend on syslogd to deliver the information (accounting, errors, etc.) tothe appropriate place. Syslog (syslogd) reads a configuration file(/etc/syslog.conf) on startup to determine what facilities it will support. Syslog ususally has the following facilities and priorities: Facilities: kern user mail daemon auth syslog lpr news uucp Priorities: emerg alert crit err warning notice info debug Facilities are the types of accounting that occur and priorities are thelevel of urgency that the facilities will report. Most facilities aredivided and logged into separate accounting files. The common being daemon,auth, syslog, and kern. Priorities are encoded as a facility and a level. The facility usuallydescribes the part of the system generating the message. Priorities aredefined in . In order to by-pass or suspend system accounting it is necessary tounderstand how it works. With syslog, it is important to know how toread and determine where accounting files are delivered. This entailsunderstanding how syslog configures itself for operation.# Reading and understanding /etc/syslog.conf. Lines in the configuration file have a selector to determine themessage priorities to which the line applies and an action. The actionfields are separated from the selector by one or more tabs. Selectors are semicolon separated lists of priority specifiers. Eachpriority has a facility describing the part of the system that generatedthe message, a dot, and a level indicating the severity of the message.Symbolic names could be used. An asterisk selects all facilities. Allmessages of the specified level or higher (greater severity) areselected. More than one facility may be selected using commas to separatethem. For example: *.emerg;mail,daemon.crit selects all facilities at the emerg level and the mail and daemon facil-ities at the crit level. Known facilities and levels recognized by syslogd are those listed insyslog(3) without the leading ``LOG_''. The additional facility ``mark''has a message at priority LOG_INFO sent to it every 20 minutes (this may bechanged with the -m flag). The ``mark'' facility is not enabled by afacility field containing an asterisk. The level ``none'' may beused to disable a particular facility. For example, *.debug;mail.none Sends all messages except mail messages to the selected file. The second part of each line describes where the message is to be loggedif this line is selected. There are four forms: A filename (beginning with a leading slash). The file will be opened in append mode. A hostname preceded by an at sign (``@''). Selected messages are forwarded to the syslogd on the named host. A comma separated list of users. Selected messages are written to those users if they are logged in. An asterisk. Selected messages are written to all logged-in users. For example, the configuration file: kern,mark.debug /dev/console *.notice;mail.info /usr/spool/adm/syslog *.crit /usr/adm/critical kern.err @phantom.com *.emerg * *.alert erikb,netw1z *.alert;auth.warning ralph logs all kernel messages and 20 minute marks onto the systemconsole, all notice (or higher) level messages and all mail system messagesexcept debug messages into the file /usr/spool/adm/syslog, and all criticalmessages into /usr/adm/critical; kernel messages of error severity orhigher are forwarded to ucbarpa. All users will be informed of anyemergency messages, the users ``erikb'' and ``netw1z'' will be informed ofany alert messages, or any warning message (or higher) from the authorizationsystem. Syslogd creates the file /etc/syslog.pid, if possible, containing asingle line with its process id; this is used to kill or reconfiguresyslogd.# System login records There are there basic areas (files) in which system login information isstored. These areas are: /usr/etc/wtmp /usr/etc/lastlog /etc/utmp The utmp file records information about who is currently using thesystem. The file is a sequence of entries with the following structuredeclared in the include file (/usr/include/utmp.h): struct utmp char ut_line[8]; /* tty name */ char ut_name[8]; /* user id */ char ut_host[16]; /* host name, if remote */ long ut_time; /* time on */ ; This structure gives the name of the special file associatedwith the user's terminal, the user's login name, and thetime of the login in the form of time(3C). This will vary from platformto platform. Since Sun Microsystems ships SunOs with a world writable/etc/utmp, you can easily take yourself out of any who listing. The wtmp file records all logins and logouts. A null usernameindicates a logout on the associated terminal. Furthermore, the terminalname `' indicates that the system was rebooted at the indicated time;the adjacent pair of entries with terminal names `' and `' indicate thesystem maintained time just before and just after a date command haschanged the system's idea of the time. Wtmp is maintained by login(1) and init(8). Neither of these programscreates the file, so if it is removed or renamed record-keeping is turned off.Wtmp is used in conjunction with the /usr/ucb/last command. /usr/adm/lastlog is used by login(1) for storing previous login dates, times,and connection locations. The structure for lastlog is as follows: struct lastlog time_t ll_time; char ll_line[8]; char ll_host[16]; ; The structure for lastlog is quite simple. One entry per UID, and it isstored in UID order. Creating a lastlog and wtmp editor is quite simple. Example programs areappended at the end of this file.# System process accounting Usually, the more security-conscience systems will have process accountingturned on which allows the system to log every process that is spawned./usr/adm/acct or /usr/adm/pacct are the usual logfiles that store theaccounting data. These files can grow quite large as you can imagine, andare sometimes shrunk by other system applications and saved in a compressedformat as /usr/adm/savacct or something similar. Usually, if the accounting file is there with a 0 byte length then you canrest assured that they are not keeping process accounting records. If theyare however, there are really only two methods of hiding yourself from thisform of accounting. One, you can suspend or stop process accounting (which is usually done with the "accton" command) or you can edit the existingprocess logfile and "wipe" your incriminating records. Here is the common structure for the process accounting file: struct acct char ac_comm[10]; /* Accounting command name */ comp_t ac_utime; /* Accounting user time */ comp_t ac_stime; /* Accounting system time */ comp_t ac_etime; /* Accounting elapsed time */ time_t ac_btime; /* Beginning time */ uid_t ac_uid; /* Accounting user ID */ gid_t ac_gid; /* Accounting group ID */ short ac_mem; /* average memory usage */ comp_t ac_io; /* number of disk IO blocks */ dev_t ac_tty; /* control typewriter */ char ac_flag; /* Accounting flag */ ; It is extremely tricky to remove all of your account records since if youdo use a program to remove them, the program that you run to wipe therecords will still have a process that will be appended to the logfileafter it has completed. An example program for removing process accounting records is includedat the end of this article. Most sysadmins don't pay real attention to the process logs, since theydo tend to be rather large and grow fast. However, if they notice that abreak-in has occurred, this is one of the primary places they will look forfurther evidence. On the other hand, for normal system monitoring, you should be more worriedabout your "active" processes that might show up in a process table listing(such as ps or top). Most platforms allow the general changing of the process name without havingany kind of privileges to do so. This is done with a simple program as notedbelow: #include #include int main(argc, argv) int argc; char **argv; char *p; for (p = argv[0]; *p; p++) *p = 0; strcpy(argv[0], "rn"); (void) getchar (); /* to allow you to see that ps reports "rn" */ return(0); Basically, this program waits for a key-stroke and then exits. But,while it's waiting, if you were to lookup the process it would show the nameas being "rn". You're just actually re-writing the argument list of thespawned process. This is a good method of hiding your process or programnames ("crack", "hackit", "icmpnuker"). Its a good idea to use this methodin any "rogue" programs you might not want to be discovered by a systemadministrator. If you cant corrupt your process arguments, rename your program to somethingthat at least looks normal on the system. But, if you do this, make sure thatyou don't run the command as "./sh" or "./ping" .. Even this looks suspicious.Put your current path in front of your PATH environment variable and avoidthis mistake.# Tripping the wire That little piss-ant up at Purdue thinks he has invented a masterpiece..I'll let his words explain what "Tripwire" is all about. Then, i'll go oversome brief flaws in tripwire and how to circumvent it.---- Tripwire README Introduction 1.0. Background ================ With the advent of increasingly sophisticated and subtle account break-ins on Unix systems, the need for tools to aid in the detection of unauthorized modification of files becomes clear. Tripwire is a tool that aids system administrators and users in monitoring a designated set of files for any changes. Used with system files on a regular (e.g., daily) basis, Tripwire can notify system administrators of corrupted or tampered files, so damage control measures can be taken in a timely manner. 1.1. Goals of Tripwire ======================= Tripwire is a file integrity checker, a utility that compares a designated set of files against information stored in a previously generated database. Any differences are flagged and logged, and optionally, a user is notified through mail. When run against system files on a regular basis, any changes in critical system files will be spotted -- and appropriate damage control measures can be taken immediately. With Tripwire, system administrators can conclude with a high degree of certainty that a given set of files remain free of unauthorized modifications if Tripwire reports no changes.---- End of Tripwire excerpt Ok, so you know what tripwire does. Yup, it creates signatures for allfiles listed in a tripwire configuration file. So, if you were to changea file that is "tripwired", the proper authorities would be notified and yourchanges could be recognized. Gee. That sounds great. But there are acouple of problems with this. First, tripwire wasn't made to run continuously (i.e., a change to a systembinary might not be noticed for several hours, perhaps days.) This allowssomewhat of a "false" security for those admins who install tripwire. The first step in beating tripwire is to know if the system you are onis running it. This is trivial at best. The default location wheretripwire installs its databases are /usr/adm/tcheck or /usr/local/adm/tcheck. The "tcheck" directory is basically made up of the following files: -rw------- 1 root 4867 tw.config drwxr----- 2 root 512 databases The file "tw.config" is the tripwire configuration file. Basically, it's alist if files that tripwire will create signatures for. This file usuallyconsists of all system binaries, devices, and configuration files. The directory "databases" contains the actual tripwire signatures forevery system that is configured in tw.config. The format for the databasefilenames are tw.db_HOSTNAME. An example signature entry might look like:/bin/login 27 ../z/. 100755 901 1 0 0 50412 .g53Lz .g4nrh .g4nrt 0 1vOeWR/aADgc0oQB7C1cCTMd 1T2ie4.KHLgS0xG2B81TVUfQ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nothing to get excited about. Basically it is a signature encrypted in oneof the many forms supplied by tripwire. Hard to forge, but easy to bypass. Tripwire takes a long time to check each file or directory listed inthe configuration file. Therefore, it is possible to patch or change a systemfile before tripwire runs a signature check on it. How does one do this?Well, let me explain some more. In the design of tripwire, the databases are supposed to be kept either ona secure server or a read-only filesystem. Usually, if you would want topatch a system binary 9 times out of 10 you're going to want to have rootaccess. Having root access to by-pass tripwire is a must. Therefore, if youcan obtain this access then it is perfectly logical that you should be able toremount a filesystem as Read/Write. Once accomplished, after installing yourpatched binary, all you have to do is: tripwire -update PATH_TO_PATCHED_BINARY Then, you must also: tripwire -update /usr/adm/tcheck/databases/tw.db_HOSTNAME (If they are making a signature for the tripwire database itself) You'll still be responsible for the changed inode times on the database.But that's the risk you'll have to live with. Tripewire wont detect the changesince you updated the database. But an admin might notice the changed times.# Wrapping up the wrappers Ta da. You got the access. uh-oh. What if they are running a TCPwrapper? There are three basic ways they could be running a wrapper. They have modified /etc/inetd.conf and replaced the daemons they want to wrap with another program that records the incoming hostname and then spawns the correct daemon. They have replaced the normal daemons (usually in /usr/etc) with a program that records the hostname then launches the correct daemon. They have modified the actual wrappers themselves to record incoming connections. In order to bypass or disable them, you'll first need to know whichmethod they are using. First, view /etc/inetd.conf and check to see if you see somethingsimilar to: telnet stream tcp nowait root /usr/etc/tcpd telnetd ttyXX This is a sure sign that they are running Wietse Venema's tcp_wrapper. If nothing is found in /etc/inetd.conf, check /usr/etc and check for anyabnormal programs such as "tcpd", "wrapd", and "watchcatd". Finally, ifnothing is still found, try checking the actually daemons by running"strings" on them and looking for logfiles or by using sum and comparing themto another system of the same OS that you know is not using a wrapper. Okay, by now you know whether or not they have a wrapper installed. Ifso you will have to now decide what to do with the output of the wrapper.You'll have to know where it put the information. The most common wrapperused is tcp_wrapper. Here is another README excerpt detailing where theactually output from the wraps are delivered.---- Begin of tcp_wrapper README 3.2 - Where the logging information goes ---------------------------------------- The wrapper programs send their logging information to the syslog daemon (syslogd). The disposition of the wrapper logs is determined by the syslog configuration file (usually /etc/syslog.conf). Messages are written to files, to the console, or are forwarded to a @loghost. Older syslog implementations (still found on Ultrix systems) only support priority levels ranging from 9 (debug-level messages) to 0 (alerts). All logging information of the same priority level (or more urgent) is written to the same destination. In the syslog.conf file, priority levels are specified in numerical form. For example, 8/usr/spool/mqueue/syslog causes all messages with priority 8 (informational messages), and anything that is more urgent, to be appended to the file /usr/spool/mqueue/syslog. Newer syslog implementations support message classes in addition to priority levels. Examples of message classes are: mail, daemon, auth and news. In the syslog.conf file, priority levels are specified with symbolic names: debug, info, notice, ..., emerg. For example, mail.debug /var/log/syslog causes all messages of class mail with priority debug (or more urgent) to be appended to the /var/log/syslog file. By default, the wrapper logs go to the same place as the transaction logs of the sendmail daemon. The disposition can be changed by editing the Makefile and/or the syslog.conf file. Send a `kill -HUP' to the syslogd after changing its configuration file. Remember that syslogd, just like sendmail, insists on one or more TABs between the left-hand side and the right-hand side expressions in its configuration file.---- End of tcp_wrapper README Usually just editing the output and hoping the sysadmin didnt catch thethe wrap will do the trick since nothing is output to the console(hopefully).# Example programs The following are short and sweet programs that give you the abilityto edit some of the more common logfiles found on most platforms. Mostof these are pretty simple to compile, although some might need minorporting and OS consideration changes in structures and configurations.---- Begin of /etc/utmp editor:/* This program removes utmp entries by name or number */#include #include #include #include void usage(name)char *name; printf(stdout, "Usage: %s [ user ] or [ tty ]\n", name); exit(1);main(argc,argv)int argc;char **argv; int fd; struct utmp utmp; int size; int match, tty = 0; if (argc!=2) usage(argv[0]); if ( !strncmp(argv[1],"tty",3) ) tty++; fd = open("/etc/utmp",O_RDWR); if (fd >= 0) size = read(fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp)); while ( size == sizeof(struct utmp) ) if ( tty ? ( !strcmp(utmp.ut_line, argv[1]) ) : ( !strcmp(utmp.ut_name, argv[1]) ) ) lseek( fd, -sizeof(struct utmp), L_INCR ); bzero( &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp) ); write( fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp) ); size = read( fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp) ); close(fd);---- End of /etc/utmp editor---- Begin of /usr/adm/wtmp editor:/* This program removes wtmp entries by name or tty number */#include #include #include #include void usage(name)char *name; tty ]\n", name); exit(1);void main (argc, argv)int argc;char *argv[]; size = read( fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp) ); } if (!x) printf("No entries found."); else printf(" entries removed."); printf("\n"); close(fd);}---- End of /usr/adm/wtmp editor---- Begin of /usr/adm/lastcomm editor:#!/perlpackage LCE;$date = 'Sun Jul 4 20:35:36 CST 1993';$title = 'LCE';$author = 'Phreak Accident';$version = '0.0';$copyright = 'Copyright Phreak Accident';#------------------------------------------------------------------------------# begin getopts.pl# Usage: &Getopts('a:bc'); # -a takes arg. -b & -c not. Sets opt_*.sub Getopts local($argumentative)=@_; local(@args,$_,$first,$rest,$errs); local($[)=0; @args=split(/ */, $argumentative ); while(($_=$ARGV[0]) = /^-(.)(.*)/) ($first,$rest) = ($1,$2);$pos = index($argumentative,$first);if($pos >= $[) if($args[$pos+1] eq ':') shift(@ARGV);if($rest eq '') $rest = shift(@ARGV);eval "\$opt_$first = \$rest;"; else eval "\$opt_$first = 1";if($rest eq '') shift(@ARGV);else $ARGV[0] = "-$rest"; else print STDERR "Unknown option: $first\n"; ++$errs; if($rest ne '') $ARGV[0] = "-$rest"; else shift(@ARGV); $errs == 0;# end getopts.pl#------------------------------------------------------------------------------sub Initialize ");# If you don't run nis... open(I,"ypcat group split(/ /,'Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat');for ($x=$[ ; $x
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